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WOMEN CHARGED WITH VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST FAMILY 
MEMBERS IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1970-1980: EARLY 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE FEMALE OFFENDER 
By SONIA WALKER' 
Women who commit serious violent crimes pose considerable dilemmas for the 
legal system. As criminals, they are perceived to require punishment. As women, it is 
often difficult for the court to reconcile their criminal actions with the behaviour 
associated with the stereotypical feminine woman. When women have killed or 
attempted to kill close family members, the discrepancy between a woman's actions 
and the behaviour expected of women in general is even more evident. 
Using court transcripts, this paper provides an historical examination of how 
explanations of women's lives and crimes were constructed in the 1970s in Western 
Australia. It explores how attempts were made to reconcile the violent actions of these 
women with stereotypical feminine roles. The effect of such constructions, both upon 
the way in which the woman was portrayed in court, and the sentence she received is 
examined. In particular, the paper considers whether portraying women in 
stereotypical terms minimised the punitive consequences of their actions, or whether it 
excluded information which not only more accurately reflected the women's lives, but 
which would have provided the basis for alternative pleas and defences.' 
Until recently, the study of women and crime has been a neglected subject area 
of criminology.' Studies have tended to concentrate upon male offenders and have 
either excluded females completely or have assumed they fit the male pattern.' Klein 
examined the few traditional studies on criminology which have specifically addressed 
the issue of women and Ciime.' She concluded: 
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The writers see criminality as the result of individual characteristics 
that are only peripherally affected by social and political forces. These 
characteristics are of a physiological or psychological nature and are 
uniformly based on implicit or explicit assumptions about the inherent 
nature of women.' 
Thus, these early writers believed that economic, social and political factors were 
marginal or irrelevant in establishing why women committed crimes. It was thought 
that women did so for idiosyncratic reasons and explanations for their actions were 
sought within the realm of the woman's psyche. 
In the 1970s, feminist writers began to redress this imbalance in the literature. 
They criticised conventional criminology, claiming that women were invisible in most 
studies of crime and that when women were studied it was in a distorted way.' Smart, 
for example, critique discussed the paucity of literature on women and crime. She 
explored the crude stereotyping of female behaviour in criminology texts, and the 
exclusion of social and economic factors from analyses of women and crime. In 
particular, she emphasised the long term effects that earlier writers had, both on the 
understanding of female crime,' and the treatment of female offenders: 
[Their] work on female criminality has served to create an ideological 
framework in which later, more contemporary studies have 
developed ... variations on [their] beliefs ... all appear in later works on 
female criminality.' 
Subsequent studies' have continued to address the issues outlined by Smart." 
However, the majority of these works do not critique the stereotypical notions of 
female criminality in criminology texts. They extend the analysis to examine whether 
women are defined in these terms when they appear in court. Central to these studies 
is the issue of how women are treated by the court when they are portrayed as 
conforming to stereotypical assumptions about femininity. 
Allen's studies, for example, examined how women's lives may be constructed 
to conform to these stereotypical assumptions." Her work demonstrates the process of 
transformation whereby a woman who has committed an intentional and culpable act 
is presented to the court as a woman who possesses an almost child like helplessness 
and who would be incapable of acting at all. Allen's predominant concern is with the 
attempts which are made in professional reports to define women in terms of 
Klein, supra. note 2 at 58. 
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pathology, thereby removing the notion that they are responsible for, or intended to 
commit, their crimes. 
Worrall 's 1990 study expands on Allen's analysis and considers the extent to 
which women are defined within stereotypical feminine discourses.12 However, 
Worrall's  approach differs from Allen's in that her study is primarily based upon 
interviews with magistrates, solicitors, psychiatrists and probation officers. These 
interviews are used to explore attitudes to female offenders. Worrall argues that 
magistrates, solicitors and others tend to see female law breakers in terms of a duality. 
They are either women who have conformed to feminine role models or women who 
have breached these models. Because criminality is perceived as a masculine trait" one 
would expect women who have broken the law to be defined as women who have 
failed to live up to the feminine model. However, Worrall argues that if a woman's 
life is constructed in terms of conformity to stereotypical feminine roles the issue of 
her criminality is minimised. The court perceives these women as "proper" women 
and since such women do not, according to assumptions about femininity, exhibit 
masculine traits they cannot be criminal. Worrall suggests that the criteria used to 
establish whether a woman is a "proper" woman includes: 
a) the extent of [the] woman's domestic responsibilities; b) the extent 
to which her appearance, demeanour and life style accord with sexual 
'normality'; and, c) the extent to which her problems can be 
pathologised and 'treated'. In short, the woman is constructed within 
the discourses of domesticity, sexuality and pathology.1' 
Failure to conform to these roles suggests that the woman is not a "proper" woman 
and is therefore capable of criminal behaviour. This woman may be doubly punished 
because she has infringed both the law and society's expectations of feminine 
behaviour.1' 
Worrall's analysis demonstrates the proposition that women are portrayed in 
stereotypical terms in courts and in probation reports. However, without more 
extensive analysis of individual trials, it is difficult to concur that portraying women in 
these terms minimises the punitive consequences of their actions. Without knowing 
the details of the crime, it is impossible to assess the choices which lawyers could 
have made in order to defend the woman concerned. A murder charge, for example, 
which is reduced to manslaughter, may look like a lesser sentence but if the evidence 
indicates that the woman may have been able to obtain an acquittal by claiming self 
defence, then the manslaughter charge would seem harsh. 
This paper is, in part, a response to the propositions put forward by Worrall. 
However, unlike her study, which used interviews, this paper examines the transcripts 
of individual cases and will consider whether the women were portrayed in terms of 
See Worrall, supra. note 1 and Allen, supra. note 1. 
Worrall, supra.note 1 at 31. 
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at 28. 
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stereotypical assumptions about femininity and whether portrayal in these terms 
minimised the punitive consequences of their actions. 
A second and more fundamental reason for research in this area is the 
recognition that the validity of women's experience has been consistently denied in 
law, both in tenns of legal theory and in terms of legal practice." This paper explores 
how the reality of women's lives and experience in a period of Western Australian 
history have been forced into a set of predetermined stereotypical categories that fail 
to integrate women's experience with the law, and which deny alternative accounts of 
their lives and crimes that more closely reflect the reality of their experience." The 
process whereby women's experience can be heard and validated by the court, in terms 
which do not increase criminal penalties, forn1s an essential component of this paper. 
The following analysis is divided into four main sections. The first section 
outlines the process of obtaining and selecting the criminal transcripts which formed 
the basis of this study. The second section discusses the ideologies of femininity 
which have been used to define the behaviour of women in general and female 
offenders in particular. This section examines literature in the area and considers the 
characteristics which may be said to be stereotypically feminine. In the third section, 
individual transcripts are measured against these stereotypical attributes to establish 
whether the women in this study are portrayed in stereotypical terms. The final 
section considers the effects of portraying women in these stereotypical terms. 
Particular consideration is given to the question of whether women's experience is 
denied validity and whether this portrayal excludes material which could have enabled 
the women to obtain a lesser sentence or an acquittal. 
Section 1: The Selection Process 
The cases used for this research were selected from trials heard by the Western 
Australian Supreme Court between 1970 and 1980. Considerable documentation was 
available for each case and included the verbatim transcript of the trial itself as well as 
all witness statements, statements by the offender, psychiatric reports and pre-sentence 
reports. Permission to view these records was granted by the Supreme Court Registrar 
on the understanding that individuals in the cases would not be identified. Each case 
is therefore identified only by the file number. Additional details, which might 
identify individuals, have been omitted from the text. 
The 1970s was chosen because it marked a period of transition and change for 
women in Australia. It was during this period that the women's movement in Australia 
increasingly questioned the restricted roles provided for women." The introduction of 
no fault divorce on the basis of irretrievable break down of marriage dramatically 
increased the rate of divorce in the late 70s and forever changed perceptions of the 
family unif.l' By 1976 the percentage of women in the workforce had increased to 
19 
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36%." Between 1966 and 1980 the number of married female part-time workers 
increased by 137.5%.'1 The 1970s was a period which marked women's increasing 
involvement in the world outside the private domain of the home. It was a time when 
perceptions of women's role was beginning to change. There is, however, little 
evidence of this change in the files discussed in this paper. While the role of women 
was changing, women were still constructed for the courts in stereotypical terms of 
housewife, wife and mother. 
One of the problems involved in researching this material was that only the 
name of the offender, the charge and the sentence could be obtained without approval. 
This information is contained in the Criminal Record Book which any person may 
view. However, for the purposes of this paper it was necessary to obtain considerably 
more information before files could be selected for the study. For example, the 
Criminal Record Book did not indicate the relationship between the victim and the 
offender, a factor which was important for this study. It was therefore impossible to 
establish which women's specific files needed to be requested. Rather than limit the 
choice of records, approval was gained from the Registrar to view the files of every 
female offender who had been charged with a murder, manslaughter or attempted 
killing between 1970-1980. 
Transcripts were finally chosen according to a range of criteria. In order to 
limit the number of files requested, only the names and file numbers of female 
offenders tried in the Supreme Court in Perth were taken from the Criminal Record 
Book. Permission was then sought to view each of these files. Twenty files were 
requested and 18 of these files were ultimately made available from the State 
Archives. 
Only female offenders charged with murder, manslaughter or attempted killing 
of family members were ultimately considered for inclusion. The reason for this was 
that it seemed likely that the actions of these women would call into question 
stereotypical assumptions about the role of women as housewife, wife and mother and 
that attempts would be made by lawyers and others to reconcile these women with 
these traditional roles. The process whereby these women were transformed from 
violent criminals into "good women" would therefore be evident. 
Each file obtained from the State Archives was read and considered for 
inclusion in this paper. Only complete files were selected and this precluded the use 
of two files which had pages missing from their transcripts. Additional problems 
appeared as the selection process continued. Firstly, two offenders were classed as 
intellectually handicapped by the Courts and this ultimately resulted in their acquittal. 
These files were rejected because the legal representation was solely concerned with 
the issue of capacity. Secondly, some of the cases had resulted in an acquittal because 
of evidentiary or procedural problems with the case. These files were rejected because 
the transcripts were predominantly concerned with legal technicalities. Twelves files 
remained after this process. Seven files involved women who had killed or attempted 
Ibid. at 54. 
Ibid. at 55. 
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to kill their partners, and five files involved women who had killed or attempted to kill 
their children. 
Four files were finally chosen from this sample. These were selected because 
they all contained extensive statements from the women themselves. Not all these 
statements are contained in the court transcript because the women often did not speak 
at their trial, but the files were significant in that each woman had at some point prior 
to the trial provided an account of her actions to police or others. This meant that it 
was possible to read about the woman's experience and perception of her offence, and 
compare it with the version which her lawyer finally presented to the court. 
Despite the fact that much of the material in these files is provided in the fom1 
of verbatim transcripts, the transcripts themselves cannot provide a complete picture 
of the way in which these female offenders defined themselves or were portrayed to 
the court. The texts cannot communicate body language or the tone of an individual's 
speech. They cannot explain the setting or feel of the courtroom or the physical spaces 
occupied by the participants in the case. Each of these elements can play a significant 
part in how a women is portrayed during a criminal trial. Threadgold has clearly 
expressed the problems associated with transcripts: 
The texts themselves, supposedly written representations of the fullness 
of speech, of what went on in the spaces and embodied encounters of 
the courtroom, are already fictions. As the 'written' institutions of the 
Jaw, they exclude all that cannot be written (without acknowledging 
that exclusion) and, as apparently objective transcriptions, they 
perpetuate the public myth of legal truth, fact and justice." 
Thus, the transcripts cannot be seen as a definitive account of events in the courtroom. 
Rather, they are incomplete accounts which are suggestive but not definitive of what 
may have occurred. 
Given the small number of cases used for this paper it would be incorrect to 
assert that the cases are representative of all cases of violent female offenders or even 
representative of the twenty cases actually surveyed for this paper. This paper does 
not suggest that these cases reflect the common experiences of violent female 
offenders. Issues such as race, class and age inevitably affect the way in which a 
woman's life is constructed for the courts and the kinds of sentence which a woman 
ultimately receives. What the selection of cases does attempt to show is that a detailed 
analysis of court transcripts and associated material can indicate whether sexual 
stereotyping has occurred in specific cases. It can also demonstrate how such 
stereotyping has affected the construction of women for the court. For example, the 
woman's account of her actions and reasons for the crime, contained in her initial 
statement to police, can be compared with counsel's explanation of the crime provided 
in the transcript. Comparing these accounts highlights the process whereby a woman' s  
description o f  a n  intentional act can b e  transformed into an unintended act. I t  also 
illustrates the gradual deletion of the woman's voice and perspective from the case. 
Terry Tirreadgold, "Legal Practice in the Conrts: Discourse, Gender and Ethics" (1991) 7 
Australian Journal of Law and Society 39 at 60. 
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The detailed analysis of a small number of cases also provides the opportunity to 
consider whether such stereotyping has excluded the possibility of alternative accounts 
of the woman's life and crime: accounts which would more closely reflect the reality 
of a woman's life and provide scope for alternative pleas and defences. For example, 
compruing a woman's initial statement, which provides rational explanations for an 
offence, with a subsequent construction of her actions which defines her as insane, can 
indicate that alternative accounts and pleas may have been ignored. 
Section 2: Ideologies of Femininity 
In order for judges and lawyers to define women in terms of their conformity to 
the feminine ideal they must have some perception of the attributes which characterise 
femininity. This section will consider some of the common attributes which have 
traditionally been associated with femininity. However, before turning to this analysis 
it is important to establish why the legal system deems it necessary to consider women 
in such stereotypical terms. Why is a presentation of a woman's actions which ignores 
the social, economic and ideological reasons for her crime so appealing? As Sachs 
and Wilson observed, "the my1h of femininity [has been] stronger than the evidence of 
the real females actually before the court"." 
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that, "the law sees and treats women the way 
men see and treat women"." Thus, law reflects the priorities and attitudes of the 
dominant patriarchal social order and assists in its reproduction. Smart argues that 
woman's place, preserving the traditional family values and performing the unpaid 
tasks of wife and mother are vital to the peace, good order and stability of patriarchy." 
The ideology of femininity reflects these values. Thus, a woman who conforms to this 
image is not only a good woman because she has conformed to the stereotype but 
because she has supported the perpetuation of the dominant order. 
Significantly, it is not only men that define women in terms of their conformity 
to these roles. The woman herself may intemalise these attributes and may define 
herself in the same terms." This can cause problems when a lawyer or judge is 
attempting to understand a woman's life and crime because the woman herself may 
articulate statements which conform with the stereotypical role expected of her, and at 
the same time make seemingly contradictory statements. For example, a woman who 
has killed her violent husband may say, "I loved my husband, I'm glad I killed him." 
In the transcripts studied for this paper the woman's lawyer tended to concentrate on 
the stereotypical feminine statement and ignore the other. Such an approach fails to 
explore alternative explanations for her statement and her crime. 
Carlen and Worrall have argued that femininity is constructed on the site 
vacated by masculinity: 
Albert Sachs and Joan Wilson, Sexism and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978) at 56. 
Cited in Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990). 
Carol Smart, The Ties that Bind: Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal 
Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) at 136. 
Ann Oakley, Subject Women (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) at 150. 
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On the one hand femininity is characterised by self control and 
independence. Being a normal woman means coping, caring, nurturing 
and sacrificing self interest to the needs of others. It also means being 
intuitively sensitive to those needs without them being spelt out. It 
means being more than man in order to embrace and support man. On 
the other hand, femininity is characterised by lack of control and 
dependence. Being a normal woman means needing protection. It 
means being childlike, incapable, capricious." 
Women are thus seen as, submissive, passive, docile, dependant, lacking in initiative, 
unable to act, to decide, to think." These attributes are generally qualities which are 
associated with children rather than adults. Oakley suggests that these characteristics 
are the same attributes which are associated with subordinate groups within society." 
Individuals falling within the ambit of the subordinate group are defined as well 
adjusted when they adopt the passive characteristics outlined above. Thus, women, as 
members of this subordinate group, are perceived to be well adjusted when they are 
immature, weak and helpless. They are perceived to be maladjusted or bad when they 
exhibit characteristics more closely associated with the behaviour of the dominant 
group, such as aggressiveness, assertiveness and independence. 
The subordinate feminine characteristics are constituted within a number of 
discourses which control both a society's expectations of the woman and the image 
which she has of herself. Carlen and Worrall have identified three major discourses 
within which the normal/good woman is constructed. These are domesticity, sexuality 
and pathology." 
The common factor in the way in which women are constructed within these 
discourses is the notion that, by defining woman in terms of one sphere, one is able to 
extrapolate that understanding to gain insights into a woman' s  behaviour or attitudes 
in general. Graham argues that this assumption stems from an ideology of 
equivalence. That is, the notion that the ideal of femininity involves an equation in 
which woman equals housewife equals wife equals mother." Establishing conformity 
to one role implies conformity to the other. Demonstrating that a woman is a good 
housewife demonstrates more than a woman's domestic prowess. It demonstrates her 
conformity to the standard of the stereotypically feminine woman. It establishes her 
not only as a good housewife but as a good woman. It is this notion of equivalence 
which lawyers and others seem to use when they are presenting information about a 
female offender. For example, evidence may be provided that the woman is a good 
mother because being a good mother implies that she must also be a good woman. A 
woman who is perceived to be a bad mother is more readily perceived to be a bad 
woman. 
Carlen and Worrall, supra. note 9 at 3.  
Oakley, supra. note 22 at 89.  
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Domestic work is perceived as one area in which female offenders can 
demonstrate their conformity to the stereotypical norm of femininity. Housework, as 
suggested by Graham, is not simply the application of labour power to objective tasks 
but is incorporated into the personality structure of the woman who is the housewife. 
"To be a housewife is part of the very definition of true femininity of modern Australia 
both in the woman's eyes and those of her culture"." Representing a woman in her 
domestic sphere as housewife reinforces the notion of the woman as a good woman 
and therefore worthy of the court's lenience. The following case demonstrates how 
this approach can be used by lawyers to place women within the discourse of 
domesticity. 
Section 3: Constructing the Female Offender 
(i) Women and Domesticity 
M was charged with the wilful murder of her husband." The charge was 
subsequently altered to manslaughter and M pleaded guilty to this charge. The 
transcript indicates that M had entered the bedroom and shot her husband in the leg. 
The bullet travelled through his body lodging in his heart and he subsequently 
haemorrhaged to death. 
M's actions would, on the surface, appear to provide little opportunity for her 
lawyer to portray M in any terms at all. M has, after all, pleaded guilty and all that 
remains is for sentencing to take place. Her lawyer, however, attempts to minimise the 
sentence which M will receive by addressing the Judge on factors which should be 
considered before sentence is imposed. A central component of the address focuses 
upon M's ability as a wife and housewife. Thus, her life is represented to the court in 
terms of its domestic dimensions. 
In M's case, the lawyer attempts to create a picture of domestic idyll for the 
comt where M is seen as a capable housekeeper and loving wife. Indeed, this is seen 
to be so important that he opens with the following statement: 
The defendant is 53 years old and has no previous convictions. She is 
retired-Lives in a house that faces the river and runs down to a jetty. 
Beautiful nice garden. Modern brick type of house ... Witnesses will 
indicate she appears to be a very conscientious housewife with a great 
love of her home and garden and also with a deep regard for her 
husband." 
M is immediately placed in her domestic environment. The court sees a retired woman 
who loves gardening and housework and cares for her husband. The image is one of a 
happy retired couple living in rural tranquillity. This image serves the purpose of 
distancing M from the image of her as a perpetrator of violence. It is difficult to 
Ibid. at 15 I. 
File 27/74, WAS 122, Accession No. 4216. Transcript held by the State Archives, Alexander 
Library, Perth, W A. 
Ibid. at I. 
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imagine that the woman who loves gardening and lives in such a peaceful environment 
really intended to pick up a gun and shoot her husband. 
The image of woman as a good housewife and therefore by definition a good 
woman occurs in a number of other transcripts. Of course, the central feature in each 
of these cases is that the woman must be perceived not just as a housewife but also as 
a good housewife. 
Being a good [house]wife means maintaining a clean tidy home, yet 
giving the impression of doing so with a minimum of effort... Evidence 
of labour, conflict or mess is interpreted as evidence of failure rather 
than as a true reflection of the reality of women's domestic lives." 
The image is stereotypical and bears little relation to the activities of a normal 
housewife and a nom1al household routine. If a clean tidy home defines the normal 
woman, the untidy home implies the woman must be in some way abnormal and 
therefore mad or bad. In the following case, inability to keep a house clean was used 
as an indicator for insanity. 
J was charged with the wilful murder of her 14 week old baby." J had killed 
her child because she believed God had told her to sacrifice the baby. Three 
psychiatric specialists testified in this case. All concluded that J was, at the very least, 
suffering from a severe mental disorder. All three considered that she was most 
probably psychotic and suffering from schizophrenia. One report stated: 
In my opinion, [J], at the time of committing her alleged offence J was 
in an acutely disturbed mental state. She had hallucinations of hearing 
- hearing the Lord and Satan speaking to her. " 
Given these reports, the woman's behaviour and the way in which the child was killed, 
one would have expected that her lawyer would only have needed to concentrate upon 
the woman's pathology in order to obtain a verdict of unsound mind. However, rather 
than concentrating on the specific examples of the woman's pathology, for example 
her auditory hallucinations, a considerable amount of time was spent discussing J's 
domestic skills and her failure in this arena was used to demonstrate her madness. 
Indeed, the emphasis in the transcript seems to suggest that this was of greater 
significance in establishing that J was insane than the fact that she had killed a child 




Lawyer: Were the milk bottles still out then- Could you tell? This 
business of the milk being left out. I understood your wife was, up 
until then, very good with the baby. 
Carlen and Worrall, supra. note 9 at 4. 
File 39!74, WAS 864, Accession No. 4231. Transcript held by the State Archives, Alexander 
Library, Perth, W A. 
Ibid. at 5. 
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Husband: She was very careful about the way she looked after it and 
very clean. It would be most unlike her to leave the milk out all day." 
Another witness was also asked questions about J's household routine. 
Lawyer: Did you notice subsequent to that the condition of the 
kitchen? Was it clean and tidy? 
Witness: To put it mildly the place was a mess ... The kitchen sink was 
full of milk bottles. There was food in dishes and pots and there was 
unwashed crockery. The Dining room table contained the bath and the 
towels belonging to the baby. 
Lawyer: Did she normally allow the baby's water to lie there or did she 
deal with them properly? 
Witness: No. They were never allowed for any length of time. I mean 
say ten minutes, maybe fifteen minutes after the baby was bathed, they 
may have been there, but never for any length of time." 
If, as Worrall suggests, women's lives are represented by the dominant 
discourses of femininity in order to minimise punishment, one would expect that this 
case would only need to consider the woman's pathology. However it would seem, in 
the 1970s at least, that it was not sufficient for a woman to be defined through the 
discourse of pathology. A woman must be defined as mad through the discourses of 
domesticity and sexuality. Establishing that a woman is insane on the basis of gender 
neutral factors, such as hallucinations and communicating with God, is not sufficient 
to show that a woman really is insane. The court needs to be able to see that she is not 
coping with the traditional activities associated with the good/normal woman. 
(ii) Women and Pathology 
The pathological label is frequently applied to female offenders. This is 
particularly evident when women have committed crimes which do not seem to fit in 
with the stereotypical image of female behaviour." The violent woman is clearly at 
odds with this image and she is therefore more likely to be seen as sick and in need of 
psychiatric help. This is particularly so when the woman's life prior to the violent act 
is perceived to conform to stereotypical feminine behaviour. Under these 
circumstances, there seems to be an assumption that the woman must be mad. 
The case of L exemplifies this approach.'1 L was charged with attempting to 
kill her paraplegic husband. She had spent a considerable number of years caring for 
her invalid husband and running the family home. Witnesses provided accounts of her 
years of devoted nursing. One stated: 
Ibid. at 2. 
Ibid. at 6. 
See Susan Edwards, Women on Trial (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
File 13023. WAS 1426, Accession No. 4216. Transcript held by the State Archives, Alexander 
Library, Perth, W A. 
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In her capacity as nurse she gained not only the admiration of me but of 
his and her many friends. We could see that she was doing a 24 hour 
job. Her devotion was always most evident and her one thought was to 
make him comfortable in everyway that she could. She devoted her life 
to his." 
L provided rational reasons for her attempt to kill her husband. She argued that she 
was concerned for his suffering and was concerned about what was going to happen to 
him when she was admitted to hospital for minor surgery. Despite this, L's actions 
were defined as insane and she was placed in a mental hospital. 
Not all female offenders are portrayed as insane but many are portrayed as 
irrational and mentally irresponsible. Constructing women in these terms is often not 
treated by the court as indicating an aberration from female normality but is merely 
seen as an inherent characteristic of all women." Thus, the normal woman is to some 
degree perceived to be irrational and emotional. Portraying a woman in these terms 
ensures that she is perceived to conform to stereotypically feminine behaviour and is a 
"proper" woman. 
In the case of R, for example, the woman was constructed as an irrational 
individual who was depressed because her marriage had failed." R had attempted to 
kill her two children with sleeping tablets after she realised that a hoped-for 
reconciliation with her husband was not going to take place. The Doctor's report 
stated: 
Her state of mind had become such that it was one of depression of 
mood, of considerable anxiety about reconciliation and in the last two 
days prior to [her action], extreme frustration in her inability to contact 
her husband - all these led to her suffering symptoms of reactive 
depression." 
Despite the seriousness of her actions, R was given a probation order and the children 
were returned to her care. 
(iii) Women's Inability to Act 
A central factor in the cases cited above is the fact that these women were 
constructed as women who did not intend their actions or who were incapable of 
acting in the way the evidence suggests. In the case of J, her inability to consciously 
act is explained by her insanity. In the case of M, an image of a woman is constructed 
who conforms to the stereotypical role of the passive woman: a woman who would be 
incapable of pulling the trigger of a gun. 
Ibid. at 42. 
Allen, supra. note 1 at 90. 
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M's initial statement to the police officer immediately after the shooting stated 
in part, "I did it. I knew what I was doing. Look at the bruise on my leg."" A 
neighbour, who had arrived at M's house shortly after the shooting, stated that M had 
said to her, "Look at this - I couldn't take it any longer."" According to the statement 
made by her son-in-law, M had phoned him earlier in the evening and told him that, 
"she had a gun pointed at [her husband] but it wouldn't go off."" M had admitted in 
her statement to the police that she had told her husband one week prior to the 
shooting that she was going to kill him. Her statement reads, "About a week ago he 
bashed me and I told him I'd shoot him. I said I'll kill you, you bastard."" Her 
statement also indicates she had a knowledge of firearms. According to the Detective 
Sergeant, M had said her father was a lock and gunsmith and that she knew how rifles 
worked. 
By the time the case comes to court, M is represented as having no intent to 
kill her husband and has only the haziest recollection of events. She also has no 
knowledge of guns. The transcript states: 
Judge: Did she load the gun? 
Lawyer: No she didn't load it. She has never handled a gun. 
Judge: AU she did was pull the trigger. What about the safety catch? 
Lawyer: She has no reco11ection of actua11y handling the gun at all. She 
patently accepted responsibility of having picked up the gun and fired 
it ... She has fired it in some fashion but she can give no precise picture 
of the circumstances or really why she particularly fired it in the 
direction of the accused at the time ... She just cannot help in this area. 
She just cannot assist." 
This theme is repeated in the case of S who was charged with the wilful murder 
of her husband." She subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter. She had stabbed 
her husband to death outside a shopping centre. The coroner's report and details 
provided in the transcript indicated that S had received a Jetter from her husband 
which indicated the he wanted a divorce and wanted to se11 the family home. In 
response to this letter S took a knife from the kitchen and placed it in the glove box of 
her car. She drove to her husband's place of work and tackled him as he left work. 
She struck him over eleven times with the knife and inflicted violent wounds on the 
left side of the forehead, on the eyelids and on the chest. 
S's lawyer attempts to distance her from her actions by suggesting that she 
could not reco11ect stabbing her husband. He states: " ... and she herself said that she 
was not sure whether she had stabbed him." When this is contested the lawyer argues, 
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"She only recollects striking him once .. .I don't think she really knew what she was 
doing"" 
By presenting information in this way, the woman is separated from her violent 
act and she is therefore more easily perceived to fit within the dominant discourses of 
femininity. It is interesting to note that in the cases of both M and S the discussion 
about the women's memories of their violence occur within the first few pages of the 
transcripts. Suppressing the image of these women as culpable and intentional subjects 
in the early stages of their cases ensures that they are more readily perceived as 
individuals who fit the image of the good woman. 
Allen has argued that the professional reports prepared by psychologists and 
social workers often attempt to suppress or erase the actions of women which imply 
that they are aware of their actions. These reports typically, 
acknowledge the trajectory of objects in space - the knife in the hand, 
the thrust of the blade into the heart - but progressively delete from that 
trajectory all that would mark it as an action by an intentional and 
culpable subject." 
The transcripts used for this paper suggest that it is not only professional reports 
which attempt to erase or suppress intention and culpability. In the cases cited above, 
lawyers also used these techniques to separate the women from their actions. M was 
separated from the process of firing the gun and S from the process of inflicting stab 
wounds. 
(iv) Silent Women 
Each of the cases used in this paper have portrayed women in terms of their 
conformity or lack thereof to stereotypical feminine traits. The possibility of 
portraying women in these terms rests in large part upon the fact that the women 
themselves did not speak during their time in Court. Their silence reinforces the 
notion that they are the stereotypical quiet, passive, unassuming women constructed 
for the court. It also ensures that these women are perceived as "partial beings, 
needing completion, ... denied the right to be individuals with the ethical right to speak 
and be heard"." 
Worrall suggests that women's silence in the courtroom is probably not 
surprising. 
Since women are seen as [reacting] rather than acting when they break 
the law, and since they are seen to be incapable of thinking and making 
decisions, it is reasonable to assume that they need to be explained 
rather than to explain." 
Ibid. at 1 1 . 
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Silencing these women ensures that their perception of the situation is never 
presented to the court. The lawyer is able to construct an acceptable explanation of 
the woman's behaviour and suppress the information which is unacceptable. Thus the 
woman's life, is made sense of by others and not by her. The woman is silenced and 
her account of her life is not heard by the court. 
Of course, some female offenders do speak at their trial but even when they are 
able to speak they do so in terms dictated by the courts. Ardener has discussed the 
way in which individuals may speak but at the same time be muted because they 
cannot express their ideas in their own way: 
The theory of mutedness ... does not require that the muted actually be 
silent. They may speak a great deal. The important issue is whether 
they are able to say all that they would wish to say, where and when 
they wish to say it. Must they for instance re-encode their thoughts to 
make them understood in the public domain? Are they able to think in 
ways which they would have thought had they been responsible for 
generating the linguistic tools with which to shape their thoughts? If 
they devise their own code will they be understood?" 
The power of legal discourse is such that it has the ability to disqualify 
alternative accounts which may be articulated by the offender or others when these 
accounts do not fit the dominant mode of expression." This process of selecting and 
editing the accounts starts before the trial when the solicitor decides which pieces of 
information from the client's account are going to be presented to the Court and which 
will be ignored. Much of the information provided by the client is left out no matter 
how relevant or important it may seem to her. The legal version presented to the Court 
becomes the only valid version of events and alternative accounts of events are 
disqualified." 
Of central significance in this process is the effect which silencing a woman's 
account may have upon the way in which a woman experiences her trial and 
understands her crime. Presenting the edited version of events to the Court as the only 
valid and hence true version of events ensures that the woman herself may ultimately 
see her life and crime in the stereotypical terms used during the trial. For example, in 
the case of a woman who has killed her husband, minimising or ignoring the effect of 
domestic violence upon her life reinforces her own belief that she is entirely to blame 
both for her husband's abuse and her violent act. Presenting a woman as insane means 
that she may perceive herself in this way despite the fact that she may have provided 
rational explanations for her actions. Both of these situations occurred in the cases 
studied for this paper and will be considered in some detail below in Section Four. 
Thus, portraying these women in stereotypical terms confirms their already 
preconceived notions that they are the irrational or incapable people they believed 
57 
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themselves to be. This process ensures that not only is the court able to deny the 
reality of a woman's life but that the woman is able to participate in this denial. 
The following section will examine the alternative accounts of women's lives 
which have been disqualified by presenting women in stereotypical terms. 
Section 4: Disqualifying Alternative Accounts of Women's Lives and 
Crimes 
In each of the cases discussed above, the disqualification of alternative 
accounts was an integral factor in the way in which each woman's life and crime was 
presented and explained to the court. This section will consider the alternative 
accounts which were disqualified and will examine the effects which this had upon the 
legal presentation of the woman concerned and the effect which this may have had 
upon sentencing. 
The cases cited in Section Three have demonstrated how lawyers may attempt 
to construct female offenders in terms which conform to stereotypical femininity. 
Portraying women in these terms necessarily requires that accounts which do not 
conform to this image are disqualified or silenced during the course of legal 
representation. Worrall has argued that female offenders may minimise the punitive 
consequences of their actions when their lives are represented in these te1ms. She 
suggests that there is a trade-off between the legal representation of women in these 
terms and the actual sentencing outcome. The following analysis of the cases 
researched for this paper demonstrates that this may not be the case and that silencing, 
and disqualifying accounts which do not fit stereotypical notions of femininity may 
actually limit the choice of defences and pleas available to the women. 
In the case of M, the woman who shot her husband, the account which was 
obscured/ disqualified during the course of the case was the account which depicted M 
as a victim of domestic violence. M had made an initial statement to police which 
suggested she was a victim of domestic violence, and had shot her husband in response 
to his violent behaviour This statement was included in M's file but was not contained 
in the transcript. Rather than using this information to explain M's actions, domestic 
violence is only ever included peripherally in the case in order to define M in terms of 
her sexuality and pathology. Thus, domestic violence is not completely excluded from 
the account provided to the court but the social, psychological and ideological 
elements are obscured. The violence is used to personalise the experience of M rather 
than place her life and her crime in a social, economic and political context. 
The following abstracts from the transcript demonstrate how these elements of 
the crime were disqualified. The first indication in the transcript that M is a victim of 
domestic violence occurs when her lawyer discusses M's sexual relationship with her 
husband. The transcript reads: 
Lawyer: She tells me that her husband .. .If your Honour will see through 
the notes you will see an extraordinary situation where she describes 
her husband as a great lover but who had physically ill treated her. 
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Lawyer: Over periods of time - I think she expressed it this way - for 
ten minutes of heaven she had to put up with an hour of hell, but I can't 
aid your Honour in this regard because that hasn't been my experience. 
Judge: My experience is probably not as wide as yours either." 
This discussion occurs on the first page of the transcript. One can well 
imagine how M must have felt while this interchange was taking place. Silenced by 
the system, and probably already feeling excluded from the arguably masculine 
characteristics of the courtroom, she sat and listened while two men discussed her 
sexuality and her sexual relationship with her husband in a way which implied they 
had no insight into the conflicting emotions and feelings which confront a battered 
woman. Her comments, taken from a statement made immediately after she had killed 
her husband, are trivialised rather than seen as an indicator of her emotional turmoil. 
Humour is used to cover the judge and lawyer's discomfort in discussing this issue. 
There is no recognition that this information provided them with an opportunity to 
consider some of the underlying reasons why the offence took place. 
Domestic violence is also used to define M within the discourse of pathology. 
The husband's violence is used to explain M's increasing stress levels and her inability 
to cope. It is not used to suggest that M was provoked into killing or had killed in self 
defence. Indeed, the issue of self defence is discounted in this case. M had stated that, 
[Her husband] reached out from the bed and grabbed he by the neck and threw her 
backwards against the chest of drawers." A doctor's report stated that there was no 
indication she was suffering from bruising around the neck or throat. There was, 
however, evidence that she had sustained bruises on the legs but the Judge commented 
that there were insufficient injuries to establish she had been hurt that night. The 
effect of this comment is that the husband's violence is erased from the case. 
Her lawyer does not use psychiatric or psychological reports to demonstrate 
that M is pathological, but a repmt from M's own doctor is provided which states that 
the doctor had perceived M to be under considerable stress for some period of time 
prior to the shooting. The report states that M had been to see the doctor some weeks 
before the event because she had passed out. The doctor commented that M was under 
considerable strain and that he had suggested she lighten her work load because it was 
too much for her. M had discussed how isolated she was because her husband did not 
allow to her see her friends or drive the car. The doctor suggested that she try to get 
out more. The doctor had also tried to talk to M's husband and had explained that she 
needed to socialise more and that she needed to stop heavy work such as lawn 
mowing." The doctor's report is used to show M's increasing stress because she had 
too much work to do and insufficient social activities. It is not used to show the 
abusive situation which M was in and how her life seemed to be completely controlled 
by her husband. Further evidence indicated that M's husband had continued to insist 
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that she mow the lawn every week despite the fact that she kept collapsing and was, 
according to the doctor, running the risk of a heart attack. This evidence was used to 
show M's increasing stress levels, not her abuse or fear of abuse. 
M's lawyer then goes on to describe what actually occmTed on the night in 
question. The transcript states: 
[M's] husband's] family were present for a party. By 5 o'clock M's 
husband was starting to manifest signs of becoming angry. M 
suggested the family should leave. The family left and her husband's 
anger increased. There was obviously some trouble, some stress and 
strain because she appears to have got on the phone to ring for aid. G, 
her son in law, gave evidence that at some stage she rang him and 
wanted him to come down and she rang him again and in the end he 
told her not to worry him. He declined to say why she was ringing him 
in cross-examination but she was patently trying to get some help and 
he made the suggestion to her that she should sleep out the back in the 
car. Then another suggestion was out the front in a bed. There was a 
bed under a tree in a yard and she was patently trying to get some 
assistance from somewhere before the incident ever happened. She 
also phoned her daughter who lived some distance away. She was in a 
distressed state and was saying that there was trouble, her husband was 
making a lot of trouble and the daughter didn't do anything.62 
The transcript provides clear evidence that M was very distressed and frightened and 
was unable to obtain help from any member of her family. As a last resort, M 
attempted to ring her neighbours. Her lawyer stated: 
She had a reluctance to ring the neighbours next door because in spite 
of the history some matrimonial unhappiness and trouble there had been 
periods of considerable happiness- She was very fond of her husband. 
She loved him, she could not leave him.63 
Her neighbour unfortunately said she would come and see M the next day. 
The judge in M ' s  case had considerable difficulty understanding why M did 
not contact other people in her immediate neighbourhood. The lawyer reiterated the 
statements made above, about loving her husband. He did not however use the 
information from M ' s  initial statement which suggested she feared repercussions from 
her husband if she contacted neighbours. The judge also had difficulty understanding 
why M just did not leave or run away from her husband. She was considerably more 
agile than him as he suffered from arthritis and had recently undergone hip 
replacement surgery. The lawyer merely reiterates comments about M loving her 
husband and feeling she could not leave because of his disability. It is ironic that at 
this point, M is viewed critically by the court when in fact all she has done is to 
conform to the behaviour of the so called "good woman". She has sacrificed her own 
Ibid. at 7. 
Ibid. at 8. 
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self interest to the needs of her partner and has coped, cared, and nurtured. By 
drawing attention to M's loving and caring abilities in this way, the lawyer is able to 
emphasise the fact that M really is a good wife. Thus, M's ability in the domestic 
sphere is emphasised. However, reinforcing the image of the good wife is achieved at 
the expense of a more realistic understanding of M's situation. 
The striking feature of the account of events leading up to and including M's 
offence is that the issue of domestic violence is never once considered in terms of its 
social, economic or ideological dimensions. M's experience, and her response to it, 
are portrayed as idiosyncratic elements in her life which can only be explained by 
reference to her own personality. There is no acknowledgment that victims of 
domestic violence perceive themselves to be totally dominated by their partners, and 
that they are frequently unable to leave because they are socially and physically 
isolated and fear reprisals from their violent partners."' If M had been portrayed in 
these terms, her failure to contact other neighbours and her failure to run away may 
have been understood more readily by the judge. However, such a construction 
requires that lawyers and judges actually have some insight into the reasons and 
effects of domestic violence. A study by Bacon and Lansdowne suggests that lawyers 
frequently cannot or do not seem to understand the issue of domestic violence from a 
woman's  perspective. Bacon and Lansdowne concluded that: 
The images of women as victims, neurotics and provocateurs, and the 
ideology of privacy which surrounds the institutions of sexuality and 
the family, play a role in perpetuating the domination and violence 
experienced by these women. The same ideologies and myths pervade 
the criminal justice system and [prevent] the actual circumstances of 
these homicides emerging in the court . . .  " 
At first glance it looks as if the portrayal of M in terms of the dominant 
discourses of femininity, may have reduced her sentence. The information in the 
transcript indicates that M's  charge was reduced from murder to manslaughter. 
However, a closer examination of the transcript and the initial statements made to 
police suggests that M may have been able to receive an acquittal had the issue of the 
husband's  violence been more adequately addressed. Presenting M in stereotypical 
terms as a passive woman who was incapable of acting, and obscuring the information 
on domestic violence which gave M possible cause to act, precluded any arguments 
relating to self defence. This is because self defence suggests that the woman is 
responding rationally to a threatening situation and has acted capably and to some 
degree aggressively in order to protect herself. This image just does not fit with the 
image created. Rather than provide an account which more closely reflects the reality 
of this woman's life, M is portrayed in terms which perpetuate the notion of the 
stereotypical woman. This construction of M's life and actions also perpetuates the 
notion that domestic violence is a private act and not an event with social, economic 
and ideological dimensions. Portraying M in these terms quite possibly resulted in 
more punitive consequences than she would have received had the issue of domestic 
violence been more adequately considered. 
Edwards, supra. note 40. 
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M's case is not the only one which denied or obscured alternative accounts of a 
woman's life and crime. In the case of J, the woman who had sacrificed her child, the 
issue of motherhood was carefully ignored. One could almost be forgiven for 
forgetting that the case is about a woman who killed her own child. What is at issue in 
this case is J' s insanity, identified by her failure to conform to the specific domestic 
requirements of cleanliness and tidiness. 
J' s case is in many ways significantly more complex than the case of M. It is 
perhaps more difficult to look beneath the labels which have been ascribed to J, 
because in many ways the labels fit her situation relatively well. They do not seem 
incongruous because J is clearly the irrational, insane woman which the court 
recognises. Yet, if one considers J' s situation in its entirety, it is possible to discern 
how these labels have enabled the court to ignore at least some of the social, economic 
and ideological dimensions of this woman' s  life. The following analysis demonstrates 
how the image created of J obscured an analysis which dealt with the social and 
psychological issues of motherhood. 
At no stage in the account provided to the court was the birth of the child 
considered to be a precipitating factor in J' s illness. This is despite the fact that there 
was no previous history of mental illness and it was only after the child's birth that J 
began to believe that God was talking to her. In some ways this failure to account for 
J' s mental instability in terms of birth and lactation is surprising. Defining J in terms 
of a pathology associated with childbirth would conforn1 with the notion that female 
reproductive biology is a disease which results not only in hormonal imbalance but can 
create unbalanced women." Conforming to such a definition would clearly 
demonstrate that J was a stereotypical woman. 
One possible reason that this argument was not used is that the provision for 
infanticide was only inserted in the Western Australian Criminal Code in 1986. 
Section 281A recognises that a woman who kills her child when the balance of her 
mind is disturbed from lactation or childbirth is guilty of infanticide. Section 287 A 
provides that the woman is liable to imprisonment for seven years when she has 
committed the crime of infanticide. However, the judge has discretion as to the 
sentence awarded. Given that the provision was not available, her lawyer did not need 
to establish that J' s mental instability was the result of childbirth. Nevertheless, it is 
surprising that the issue was not used to demonstrate J' s insanity as it seems to provide 
a stereotypical reason for J' s insanity and has more relevance than the evidence 
provided of J' s domestic skills. 
It could be argued that her lawyer ignored this issue because it ensured that the 
potential psychological and social problems occasionally associated with childbirth 
were disqualified from the account and the role of tl1e mother was somehow kept in its 
pristine form. A woman is meant to be at her most fulfilled when she is mothering a 
small baby. She is not meant to be driven insane by the activity. By ignoring the 
psychological, social and economic aspects of her crime, J the woman, not J the 
mother, is identified as the problem. She needs to be defined within the discourse of 
Carlen and Worrall, supra. note 9 at 6. 
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pathology because it is incomprehensible to society that a sane woman would damage 
her baby. However, her pathology needed to be of a kind which is in no way 
associated with her role as child bearer and mother. As one commentator notes, "To 
admit that the social and economic circumstances of motherhood may cause crime is 
to open a hitherto tightly closed box"." In J's  case an alternative account of her life 
and crime would probably not have resulted in an alternative verdict. However, a 
portrayal which defined her in more realistic terms may have influenced the treatment 
she received. 
While J was clearly insane, there are other cases where the label of insanity is 
applied in circumstances where that label is possibly not warranted. Portraying a 
woman as insane precludes an account of a woman's life which demonstrates sane 
reasons for her crime. Mrs L's attempt to kill her sick husband falls into this category. 
As was demonstrated in the section on pathology, L was portrayed as a caring and 
nurturing woman who could only have committed such a crime because the balance of 
her mind was disturbed. However, L 's explanation for her crime appears to be based 
upon a rational approach to a difficult dilemma. In her statement to the police, L 
explained that she had given her paraplegic husband an overdose of sleeping tablets 
shortly after he had lost the ability to speak. 
The reason why I gave [him] the sleeping tablets was because he had 
suffered enough and I was going into hospital and didn't know how 
long I would be in. I knew [he] could not look after himself and would 
have to be put in hospital. The fact that he could not communicate was 
the problem. I thought this would be the kindest thing to do to [him] . I 
know it is wrong to play God but [he] has suffered so long." 
While individuals may not agree with her choice of action, her reasons are not the 
reasons of an insane women. By portraying L in these terms, she is represented as 
conforming to the stereotypical role of the mentally unstable woman, but such a 
portrayal does not seem to reflect the reality of her situation. Moreover, in terms of 
sentencing, it has serious consequences. L was acquitted on the basis of unsound 
mind. Superficially, this may look like a less punitive result than a verdict of guilty for 
an attempt to unlawfully kill but when an offender is acquitted on the basis of unsound 
mind the judge must order that the individual remain in strict custody, most probably 
in a mental institution, until Her Majesty's Pleasure is known. The judge has no 
discretion in the sentence awarded. One can only speculate how it must feel to be 
placed in a mental institution for an indefinite period of time when one is not insane. 
In contrast, the judge does have a discretion in sentencing when the offender is found 
guilty of unlawful killing The judge may even place the offender on probation rather 
than imposing a prison term. 
This is exactly what happened in the case of R who was found guilty of 
attempting to unlawfully kill her two children." This case was discussed in the section 
Judith Osborne, "The Crime of Infanticide: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water" 
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on women and pathology. R was portrayed to the Court as an irrational/depressed 
woman who was having difficulty dealing with her marital breakdown. She was not 
portrayed as insane. R was given a probation order with compulsory psychological 
counselling and the children were returned to her care. Given the extenuating 
circumstances in L's situation, it seems possible that a plea of guilty coupled with a 
presentation by Counsel which emphasised the extreme stress L was under when she 
committed the offence, may have resulted in an equally lenient outcome. 
Disqualifying an account of L as a sane woman precluded this possibility. 
As the previous cases demonstrate, disqualifying or obscuring alternative 
accounts of a woman' s  life and crime can have a considerable impact on the way in 
which a woman is portrayed to the court and the sentence which she receives. 
Ignoring these factors and portraying a woman in stereotypical terms which precludes 
an analysis of the social, economic and ideological dimensions of her life not only 
results in a legal presentation which fails to deal with the reality of her life, but also 
potentially limits the choices which can be made about her plea and the defences 
which may be raised. 
Conclusion 
The violent female offenders in this study were constructed in the stereotypical 
terms first identified by Worrall and Allen." Each woman was portrayed to the court in 
terms of her ability to conform to the roles and the behaviour traditionally associated 
with the feminine woman. These attributes included, but were not confined to, the 
woman's domestic skills, her pathology and her inability to act with intent and 
volition. 
Central to this paper was an examination of the effect which this stereotyping 
had, both upon the way in which a woman's life and actions were portrayed to the 
court and the sentence she received. The study indicates that, for these women at least, 
the use of stereotypical images gradually deleted any information from their cases 
which suggested they were capable of acting, or were aware they were acting. The 
effect of this process was threefold. Firstly, it aided the perception that these women 
either did not commit the violent crimes of which they were accused or did not intend 
to commit these crimes. Secondly it deleted from the case any information which 
presented a contrary image to the court and which indicated an alternative rationale for 
their crime. Crucially, it invariably deleted the woman's  own account of her actions 
and her perception of her crime. 
The issue of women being silenced is significant. Because law has the power 
to disqualify alternative accounts and dismiss women's experience, a woman is denied 
the right to speak and to explain herself in her own terms. Analysing the transcripts 
for this study demonstrated how a woman's experience is mediated through others in 
terms which fail to reflect the complexity of her situation. The study by Bacon and 
Lansdowne'1 and the interviews by Worrall suggest that this problem is compounded 
Worrall and Allen, supra. note I .  
Cited in  Edwards, supra. note 36. 
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by the fact that lawyers and other professionals often don't understand or recognise 
women's  experience. 
The final section of the paper considered whether the women in this study 
benefited from a stereotypical construction of their lives. Worrall suggested that 
women had the punitive consequences of their actions minimised when they were 
presented in these terms. The cases of S and R support this proposition. S received a 
probation order even though she had killed her husband. R received a probation order 
even though she had attempted to kill her two children. Both of these women were 
presented to the court as irrational women who did not know what they were doing. 
Significantly, however, two cases do not support Worrall' s  proposition. In 
these two cases the women would seem to have received harsher penalties for their 
crime precisely because their lives were constructed in stereotypical terms. In the case 
of M, defining her life in terms of an idyllic domestic existence precluded any 
examination of the effect of domestic violence upon her life. This was compounded 
by the failure to consider M as a woman capable of acting intentionally which 
precluded an analysis of her actions as a form of self defence. A less stereotypical 
analysis of her life may have enabled her lawyer to establish that M had responded in 
self defence and this could have resulted in an acquittal rather than a prison term. In 
the case of L, defining her actions within the discourse of pathology resulted in an 
acquittal on the basis of unsound mind but the consequences were that she was 
committed to a mental institution. A construction of her life which dealt with the 
complexity and stress of her situation may have enabled the court to see her actions as 
those of a rational woman in an intolerably difficult situation. Like R, she may have 
been able to obtain a probation order rather than a prison term and she would not have 
been placed in a mental institution for an indefinite term. 
These cases suggest that the construction of women' s  lives in stereotypical 
terms does not always minimise the punitive consequences of their actions. The 
stereotypical presentation of these women distanced them from their actions, and 
obscured their reasons for these actions. This precluded an analysis that defined these 
women in tem1s of their intent and their rationality. Moreover, it precluded an 
analysis that was effectively able to incorporate the complexity of each woman's 
story. It silenced those women, disempowered them and for, some at least, penalised 
them even more. 
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